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Abstract 
Author writes about the condition of theoretical biology and its relation with philosophy. It is 
emphasised that the dominant ideology of the last decades, pretending a united thinking, has 
influenced the development of an integrative natural scientific thinking. The fact relevant tasks of 
education and research are derived from it. 
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Introduction 
It is a great responsibility to draw a reliable picture of the development of 
theoretical thinking within biology because however much it is tried to fight 
against it, specialization within biology grows to huge dimensions and it is a great 
responsibility, because there are ones who show their results on their own. 
The picture will be partial and think it is good if we draw the exterior 
bounds of message well in advance: the concrete questions of biology will not be 
mentioned, although some problems could be debated , but we are not so at 
home on this field as those who deal with this subject day by day and that is why 
we can hardly give clear solutions. The development of theoretical thinking and 
examination of its application remain our subject in Hungary and of course not 
all questions of detail can be discussed. 
Theory takes a very contradictional place on the base of traditions in 
Hungarian biology. 
In spite of this we have some high qualified theorists, theory has not already 
taken its place in the system of biology and theory is thought to be an "idle chat" 
which is a slight help with the solution of practical questions. 
Although pioneers of theoretical biology derive historically from Hungary 
too ( B A U E R , 1 9 6 7 ; BERTALANFFY, 1 9 3 2 , 1 9 3 4 ) situation, which has developed in 
connection of theoretical thinking, can not be compared to those central role, 
what theory plays in European and North-American research (GARCIA, 1982; 
JACOB, 1 9 7 0 , M O Z A , 1 9 8 9 ; WADDINGTON, 1 9 6 5 ) . 
One of its causes is our isolation, which can be experienced in connection of 
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theoretical thinking, otherwise the effect of the dominant ideology of the last 
decades can not be neglected. Several works were translated on the field, which 
clearly show the conceptual marks of philosphy (NOVINSZKIJ and PLATONOV, 1 9 5 4 : 
F R O L O V , 1 9 7 5 ) this formal theoretical, apparently organic union, had a paralysing 
effect on integrated thinking within specialized branches of science. 
The anomalies of thinking of theoretical biology 
The subject of biology, examining living nature , has significantly advanced, 
especially during the last decades. The significance of generalisation of accumu-
lated knowledge as a result of research, its theoretical summary and apprehension 
overgrow the boundaries of biology. 
It derives f rom the characteristics of biology that its subject adjoins f rom one 
side, the not living nature, on the other side society. So it is clear since its 
becoming a sufficient subject, results reached by biology, correlations and 
theories served unaviodable as a subject of philosophical-ideological analyses and 
valuation. The different systems — but especially those of their ambitions, were 
perfectness — handled the questions of origin of life, its essence, its concept, the 
development and determination of living nature , the origin of man or evolution 
and function of mind as essential problems. 
In spite of these, we can state that the general theoretical evaluation of 
biology — although a lot of conceptions, with an ambition for approaching 
synthesis f rom different directions, have been published — still come up against 
a diffeculty ( B R I T T O N , 1 9 6 9 ; L A Z C A N O - A R A N J O , 1 9 8 5 ; C H A N G E U X , 1 9 8 5 ) . 
Some questions will be stressed and examined in detail among its reasons. 
Variety of manifestation of life necessiated biology to convert to a system of 
branch sciences, examining the most different part fields. Certain scientific 
branches in biology have developed a particular method for examination, a lot of 
special independent institutions had been established and the consequence is an 
almost confused special literature. Such a situation has been established that it 
becomes more and more difficult for a researcher to follow the results of his own 
field of research or especially the ones of fur ther branches of science and their 
registration. 
The growing specialization and differentiation with the development of 
sciences and its manifestation within biology had a result that a great part of 
researchers had given up their earlier existed claim for the establishment of a 
comprehensive biological view and now they are satisfied with the modest 
purpose to work up the literature of direct research field and to place their 
results in the knowledge system of the given branch of science. 
On the other hand the development of the last quar to of the century has 
deepened our knowledge in such an extent that some earlier "tight-cut" 
hypothesis should have been given up and a demand on creating of new synthesis 
appeared with a thunderous force. The situation is becoming more and more 
complicated through the evidence that the characteristics of many fields of 
research are becoming interdisciplinar. Biology has less and less the principle and 
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conceptual f rame with the help its knowledge could be arranged satisfactorily 
and which could serve as a heuristic modell in the further phase of research. 
Progress can be reached by the result of those efforts which release the 
outlined conflicts. The solution of this challenge can be born out of new 
synthesis, which can serve to create new thoughts and explanations. 
Contemporal biology at home has such outstanding personages who — 
having become aware of the situation, instead of explaining the contradictional 
situation — made an attempt at establishing a modern synthesis. ( G Á N T I , 1 9 7 1 ; 
SZENTÁGOTHAI , 1 9 7 9 ; CSÁNYI, 1 9 7 6 ) . 
Now it became obvious that it was necessary within biology too, under 
descriptive — research method and "disunity" of analytical organism, that a 
reseracher should do an integrated activity and strive for a formulation of general 
conceptions or hypothesis based on scientific facts. 
Not any synthesis of all knowledge is meant , made by one man — which is 
in fact impossible — but a new way of thinking. Its characteristic is that it starts 
f rom facts if it is necessary false or archaic interpretat ion f rames are removed and 
facts are rearranged according to new concepts. New special scientific research is 
inspired through this and later it leads to a more comprehensive integration of 
the analysed facts. 
Our knowledge is hold up by a widening horizon through such a natural way 
and it does not become — in ourselves important but — an incoherent mass of 
information. This work is made difficult that no theoretical biology on a solid 
basis has been accepted (disciplines analogous to theoretical physics or theoretical 
chemistry are meant here). 
Our university education system lacks — except theoretical biology — such 
fur ther synthetical subjects as social biology or socialanthropology. 
Comprehensive works made by biologists have not taken their due place in 
scientific theory. 
Philosophy seems to be too abstract for a lot of nature researchers to 
become a bearer of a theoretical synthesis required by them. 
Scepticism for philosophy can grow to a total negation. 
While there was an intensive activity with theoratical and philosophical 
questions of natural sciences in our country during the 60ies up to recent decades 
"natural philosophy" got into an "embarassing situation": 
N o disciplinar aspect could be realised, it could not assign its role in the 
summary structure of philosophy. Its student circle became irresolute because of 
the charge "a philosophy of no full value". The cooperation of scientists and 
philosophers could not be realised on the expected level and effectivity. 
Its result was that the theoratical generalisations of biological knowledge 
and the methodological epistemological principles were all formulated out of 
philosophy. 
In the formation of the situation, social-political and scientific history played 
of course a role. The example of the creation of a general nature picture as N. 
Har tmann ' s conception, because of the lack of know, became ineffective. 
The "shy" curiosity of natural philosophy about the so called civil scientific 
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theory — originated from the critical position, that one of its tasks is to reveal 
their hidden idealistic face. As a result of this, real problems eliminated and also 
worth extrapolations. 
This happened to cybernetics, sociobiology. ethology and several branches 
of anthropology. 
Natural philosophy from dialectic materialism got into a constant hypostati-
cal situatioin, it became terminologically stiff and was not able to any philosophi-
cal thinking, which developed together with science. There were of course 
exceptions, but till these days it did not become clear where natural philosophy 
its place had and what its role was within philosophy. Scientific researchers and 
philosophers lived together in a "mutual suspicion" instead of cooperat ion. It 
derived from this source that in the latest philosophical essays, exactness and 
clearness were shaded by gleaming formulations, but glemour is only a superficial 
phenomenon. In fact one can not get rid of the suspicion that terminology is 
of ten unnecessarily bombastic. On the other hand we must remember that a 
qualified psychologist is slightly in the situation that he could work himself into 
sciences in order to follow their results and what is more to consider it critically. 
Physical, chemical and biological topics are too many folded for it, they are 
complicated and progress is too quick. 
Circumstances were a bit more favourable for natural scientists. Al though 
they are also able to survey current research condititions on a special field — as 
it was described above — but their scientific grounding makes following of 
essential result of sciences easier. What is more , not only scientists had the claim 
to raise and discuss new results on a natural scientific base. ( E R D E Y - G R U Z , 1 9 6 5 ) 
"Bridge-building" between biology and philosophy seems not to be an easy 
solvable work. Theoretical ambitions, published in home scientific reviews were 
not only qualified as "universal dilettantism", while philosophers of ten used the 
attribute "vulgar materialist of good intensions". 
It is really a basic question what the scientific "deepness" is. where natural 
philosophy can reasonably "pene t ra te" , on the other hand what the philosophical 
"highness" is. where theoratical biology should "raise"? 
Understanding of the phenomena of living nature seems to be logical, during 
its explanation you should pay attention not to "absolve" philosophy in science 
because it can really lead to a positivist or vulgar materialist point of view. 
Sticking in the level of general categories is so "dangerous" too — it must be 
so from the theoretical point of wiew — which can result an abstract apriorism. 
Abstract products of scientific research, categories of theoretical science 
compared with empirical concepts are in a tighter relationship with philosophy. 
An often formulated viewpoint is that biological theory is not well developed 
enough, it falls behind the state and level of experimental research. 
Interest in theoretical biology is growing therefore it is clear that philosophi-
cal research, which tries to reveal what way and how you can construate 
theoretical knowledge concerning the essence of living nature and its regularities 
become more and more important . 
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These investigations should clear which specifications they have gained what 
kind of nature modern biological knowledge became, thanks to those new 
methods which are nowadays not only experiments but applied in the sphere of 
theory. These investigations should reveal the regularities of logical and historical 
development of biology, the sources of development and its inner and outer 
factors. 
Summarising the earlier sayings, the conclusion can be drawn that 
philosophy should arrange its relation with science again. Research work, which 
tried to reveal the inner logic of the development of natural sciences, plays an 
important role in it. Its aim is — among other things — to clarify the role of 
different scientific interpretations and mental trends and schools in the develop-
ment and we meet a new problem: the backwardness of elaboration of biology in 
a scientific-historical way. (A good illustration of this situation is that there exists 
no education in scientific history of biology at the universities!) 
Under the development of reserach of history of science, investigations of 
theory of science and methodology of science are considered to be important . 
It is time to turn a severe attention to studies of different explanation types 
within biology and verification models and structures. 
On the other hand — and it is perhaps more important — theoretical and 
methodological problems should be surveyed and as far as possible to answer 
those that certain biological scientific branches produce out of themselves during 
their independent development (e. g. humangenetics, sociobiology and molecular 
biology, etc.) 
Theory of science — together with investigation of theory of science — 
seems to enjoy a unique prosperity in the future years and these topics can 
overtake the role, which the discipline "philosophical problems of natural sci-
ence" within education and research as well during the past years played. When 
philosophical history based on classical texts becomes dominant in philosophical 
education, it stresses the probability of the above mentioned. 
All these do not mean and can not mean that we should give up generaliza-
tion of theoretical philosophy based on knowledge of natural sciences and 
analysis of philosophically seizeable aspects of scientific problems. It should be 
seen clearly — especially on the base of experience of the last decades that a 
theoretical work with an orientation for an objective world concept should 
exceed the reference circle of special scientific examination. An ontological 
interpretation is the internal demand of phylosophy, so it can not exist just as a 
mere illustrative function. Nature is not a "collection" of philosophy. 
It is also a problem of history of philosophy how different , in principle 
divergent philosophies can integrate knowledge concerning nature? (Interpreta-
tion of the concept of „na ture" should require an extra analysis.) 
The problem is how "natural philosophy" can be inserted in the antropo-cen-
tric world concept of philosophy in the classical sfense. 
According to a socioontological viewpoint declared recently, knowledge 
concerning nature can not be the subject of philosophy, so any natural philosophy 
is impossible (VAJDA, 1967). 
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According to our point of view, general theoretical analysis concerning 
nature , can become the content elements of philosophy in so far as over 
exceeding empirism. in a wider sense, give a proper base about the place of man 
and his role and help with a higher development of old philosophical disputes. 
So theoretical philosophy can not leave the problem out of consideration 
"man as an active subject" and it should distribute philosophical antropology on 
its own way. 
It should clarify the natural particularities of man as a biological race (sex), 
his evoluationary-genetic abilities, individual mechanisms etc. i. e. all those 
physical-biological endowments which originally belong to man 's bio-social total-
ity. It should oppose historically exceeded false conceptions as the concept that 
man is solely the product of social developments and his natural biological 
endowments will dissolve in his socialness. 
Some conclusions 
In the consequence of philosophical research and education special theoreti-
cal sciences can be expected to gain a bigger significance and also theoretical 
biology. 
Demand of interpretat ion, hypotesis and theoretical work will grow i. e. 
"a philosophical" moment will appear in special sciences. Some marks of integra-
tion will more and more emerge in the integration with the differentiation of 
sciences. During this process such special sciences will be established which 
would like to fill the role of philosophy — e. g. system theory will appear as 
much a science (KINDLER and Kiss, 1969). 
It is an important question in this situation how a more general theoretical 
synthesis can be established in one special science. 
Two different integration ranges (they can be called a vertical and horizontal 
integration) do not preclude each other . At the same time theory of philosophy 
— especially epistemology — can grow in both of them. Biology can not do 
without a clear conceptual picture about itself. 
In expert training of future researchers should be trained for a synthetic 
view and methodology and so that they should be able to coordinate the results 
of several scientific branches and they should turn from one research field to 
another that during the process they will not become unscientific. 
All these will not preclude the so called traditional research fields and 
methods either. N o scientific specialization will be argued, but such a specializa-
tion that starts work so. that it does make a survey of the whole field and it 
continues its activity that it does not fit its results in any kind of united f rame. 
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